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BOOK REVIEWS
CoNcEss Am TAD COURT.

By Walter F. Murphy. Chicago: The Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 308. $6.95.
Conflict between the United States Supreme Court and the Congress
was inevitable when John Marshall announced in Marbury v. Madison
that "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."' Congress is understandably jealous
of its legislative prerogatives and the process of interpreting the law
necessarily impinges to some extent upon that of making the law.
Apart from judicial review, the Court also must exercise the judicial
power on important policy issues in areas subject to congressional
jurisdiction. A necessary result is a contribution to the formulation of
public policy of the sort which many Congressmen regard as the
exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch. Whenever any substantial number feel that a particular decision has infringed upon
legislative authority, an open reaction against the Court can be expected in the Congress.
Although recent assaults upon the Court have come largely from
conservative elements, Mr. Murphy's early chapters remind us that
this has not always been the case. In 1821 Thomas Jefferson accused.
the federal judiciary of "advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over
the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the States, and
the Government of all be consolidated into one." More than a hundred
years later, it was another champion of the people, Senator Robert M.
LaFollette, who charged that the courts had gradually usurped sovereignty until the Supreme Court had become "the actual ruler of the
American people."
Mr. Murphy is concerned primarily with what he calls "the crisis of
the Warren Court" in its relations with Congress in the 1950's, but he
wisely places this episode in historical perspective by first briefly
outlining the previous crises in the Court's history. He swiftly but
thoroughly brings us through the Federalist-Jeffersonian conflict of
the early days of the Nation, the embattled Taney Court's labors.
with the slavery question, the frustration of the Court's efforts to
defend civil liberties during Reconstruction, and the Hughes Court's.
about-face on New Deal legislation. Murphy then develops the
thesis that a clash of judicial and legislative power occurred in the
1950's which followed a "well-worn pattern." This is said to be a.
three-step course consisting of emergence of judicial power upon im1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, at 111 (1803).
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portant controversial issues, followed by severe criticism of the Court
coupled with threats of remedial or retaliatory legislative action, and
usually concluded by a tactical judicial retreat.
Congress and the Court is a good combination of broad historical
perspective and detailed behind-the-scenes legislative drama. After
stating the historical background, the author dwells in considerable
detail upon a series of Supreme Court decisions of the mid-fifties and
the congressional reaction which resulted. In retrospect, it is seen
that from 1954 to 1957 the Court handed down an unusually large
number of controversial decisions which had significant effects in
shaping public policy. Most of them favored the rights of the individual against governmental power and they were generally applauded by civil libertarians. The Court acted boldly in the vital and
sensitive areas of race relations, loyalty and security programs, the
conduct of congressional investigations, prosecution of subversion,
and admission to law practice. Close procedural and constitutional
reins were placed upon the exercise of governmental power against
the individual. The result was often an unpopular one susceptible to
such characterization from critics of the Court as "opening FBI
files
2
to Communists," which was charged after the Iencks case.
Murphy deals principally with the explosive congressional reaction
which followed. By 1958, several anti-Court bills had passed the
House and were pending in the Senate. They varied from broadside
limitations upon the appellate jurisdiction of the Court to dictating to
the Court rules of statutory construction and bills merely aimed at
reversing specific decisions. The behind-the-scenes activities on these
bills is described vividly with the suspense of a mystery novel.
Perhaps the most exciting drama is the 41-40 vote by which the
Senate actually reversed itself within a 24-hour period and defeated
H.R. 3, a bill aimed at Pennsylvaniav. Nelson,3 the case which upheld
a Pennsylvania decision that the Smith Act had pre-empted the
sedition field so that subversion against the United States could not
be prosecuted under state laws. (Unfortunately, this bill did not
merely amend the Smith Act to allow state laws to operate, but instead prescribed a general anti-pre-emption rule applicable to all
future legislation.) Another is the after-midnight point of order by
Senator Carroll which caused the death of the conference report on a
bill aimed at the Mallory decision 4 in the final moments of the 85th
Congress.
2. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
3. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
4. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), holding inadmissible a confession obtained by District of Columbia police during a period of detention for
questioning which violated the requirement of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
that arrested persons be arraigned "without unnecessary delay."
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Mr. Murphy based much of his research upon personal interviews
with participants in the legislative struggles which he describes. His
account of the conferences and negotiations which led up to revisions
and compromises on particular measures has the ring of authenticity.
He is particularly to be commended for the emphasis he places upon
the work of members of Senate staffs who are often neglected by
political analyists in studying the legislative process. The work of
various lobbies and pressure groups who attempt to influence legislation is also examined extensively and realistically.
Although generally sympathetic to judicial power, Murphy is no
apologist. His pen moves with the keen impartiality of a surgeon's
knife. He does not gloss over the personal bickering which at times
marred the Court's work and damaged its standing with the public.
He is critical at several points of the Court's technical skill and judicial
craftsmanship in certain cases. Examples of miscitation and vague
reasoning are freely pointed out.
Murphy's conclusion that by 1959 the Court had made a tactical
withdrawal in most of the controversial areas is documented by discussion of the later cases and citation of other legal experts. How
much this was due to the activities in Congress is speculative, but it is
difficult to reject Murphy's thesis that there was some direct causeand-effect relationship, despite the fact that only one measure which
originated as an "anti-Court" bill actually became law.5
Some readers may quarrel with Murphy's adherence to an institutional analysis of the Court's course during the period in question. It
is questionable that shifts or changes in emphasis or direction should
be attributed to "the Warren Court" as an institution when the particular decisions involved resulted from shifts by only one or two
of the nine Justices and the Court continued to be sharply divided
in its opinions.
Nonetheless, treatment of the Court as an institution is both common and significant, even in the Congress. Some legislators are inclined to join new attacks upon the Court because of animosity caused
by past decisions with which they disagree. Others feel constrained
to defend the Court's work against almost any legislative correction
because they wish to maintain the Court's prestige and strongly support controversial past rulings. This book quotes Senate debate to
the effect that a bill aimed at Supreme Court decisions cannot be
considered "in isolation" and appealing for votes against particular
bills because of "the symbolic effect" of supporting the Court, apart
from the substantive legislative questions involved.
I strongly believe that legislators, as well as lawyers, should be
cognizant of the lawyer's first canon of ethics: "Judges, not being
5. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
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wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to the support
of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor." 6 Both judges as individuals and the Court as an institution should receive the benefit of
this admonition, but this does not mean that judicial decisions should
become insulated from good faith examination and criticism. This is
particularly true of court decisions which interpret and apply congressional legislation. A statute does not cease to be an act of Congress
merely because a court has construed it, and we have a continuing
responsibility to examine the application of federal statutes. If a law
has been interpreted and is being applied in a manner which does
not reflect the intention of Congress (which admittedly may have
been poorly expressed), then all members should be able to approach
with an open mind the question of whether the statute should be
amended.
This thinking led me to support legislation to change the result of
the Nelson case 7 to allow state statutes to apply in the subversion
field. The same approach led me to vote for the bill which clarified
the rule of criminal procedure laid down by the Court in the Jencks
case.8 This was the single piece of legislation which finally resulted
from the anti-Court reaction described by Mr. Murphy, and the
Senate Judiciary Committee report emphasized that the bill reaffirmed
the Supreme Court's holding in Jencks that a criminal defendant is
entitled to see statements made to the FBI by a prosecution witness.
The decision virtually invited Congress to amend the Federal Code
of Criminal Procedure. In my opinion, it would have been an abdication of legislative responsibility if Congress had failed to codify this
decision and specify a uniform procedure to be followed by the district courts in according to accused persons the right recognized by
Jencks. Such legislation is not "anti-Court" but represents a mutual
accommodation by the legislative and judicial branches in the continuing processes of government.
This book is a valuable addition to the literature of a vital and
fascinating subject. Both Congress and the Court should welcome this
type of fine scholarship in the study of their relationships.
SENATOR EsTEs [KEFAUVER*

6. ABA CANONS OF PrtOFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 1 (1908).
7. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
8. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).

'Member, Senate Judiciary Committee.
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COME TAx PURPOSES. By Charles E. Ratliff, Jr. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 132. $4.00.
A little more than four years ago the United States Supreme Court,
in an opinion that had been foreshadowed for more than twenty years,
upheld taxation of an apportioned share of the net income of a
foreign corporation engaging only in interstate commerce within the
taxing state. Two states, Georgia and Minnesota, had imposed the
taxes, and two corporations, one domiciled in Alabama, the other
in Iowa, were the taxpayers. Because of the similarity of the issues,
the Court made its ruling in a single decision, Williams v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings,Inc.; Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota.'
In each instance the taxpayer was maintaining a sales office within
the jurisdiction asserting the right to tax part of the net income from
the unitary business. This was regarded as supplying sufficient "nexus"
between the corporation and the state to meet the requirements of
due process. The apportionment formula seemed to be designed to
assign to the state for tax purposes no more than a fair share of the
total net income. Accordingly, if one subscribes to the maxim that
"interstate commerce should pay its way," there was no impingement
upon the commerce clause.
Despite these considerations, accute apprehension was expressed
by elements in the business community that the doctrine enunciated
by the Supreme Court would result in disastrous burdens upon those
engaged in trade across state lines.2
So vocal were these critics of the decision that Congress was galvanized into action.' Within a few months, it passed the first federal
statute limiting the power of the states to tax those engaged in interstate business.4 Since then that law has been amended to provide
that a congressional committee "shall make full and complete studies
of all matters pertaining to the taxation of interstate commerce by
the states."5
Little wonder, then, that Professor Ratliff begins the preface to
his book with this observation: "Interest in the problem of apportioning business income for state income tax purposes has existed ever
since the levy of the first successful state corporate income tax in 1911,
but never before has it been so intense as today." As one reads what
1. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
2. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13
VAND. L. REV. 21, 44 (1959).
3. Id. at 45.

4. Title I, § 101, 73 Stat. 555 (1959).
5. 75 Stat. 41 (1961), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. III, 1961).
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he has to say about the apportionment of income it becomes increasingly apparent, however, that his views on the subject are based
almost exclusively upon a study of the effects of a 1957 change in
North Carolina law. One is struck by the appropriateness of the
book's subtitle, "With Specific Reference to North Carolina."
If the study had comprehended a wide range of the business done
by the thousands of corporations that make returns to that state with
respect to their net income, the narrowness of its scope would not be
so pronounced. The author reveals that only 393 corporations were
selected for the study and that 23 were eliminated at the outset because they were neither mercantile nor manufacturing firms or were
out of business. Of the remainder, only 123 supplied data and 51
refused to do so. Despite the paucity of the sample, the lack of any
evidence of its selection on random basis, and the bias that could result from the failure to secure data from two-thirds of those remaining
in the sample, the author expresses the belief that "the sample contacted is representative of the total population." A reader familiar
with the field may find it difficult to accept this conclusion without
serious reservations.
Following an introductory chapter in which Professor Ratliff tells
of the scope of his study, he devotes a chapter to the historical background of apportionment of income of multistate enterprises. First
he reviews briefly legal considerations in state taxation of such businesses, and then continues with a longer discussion of the economic
aspects of these revenue measures. Conceding that the trend in apportionment formulae has been toward a three-factor formula comprised of property, payroll, and sales, the author expresses a preference
for a two-factor formula confined to property and payroll. Apparently,
he is unaware of any vexatious problems encountered in the use of
property and payroll data but is convinced that "consideration of the
sales factor in a formula opens Pandora's box, indeed."
The next two chapters, which account for almost half of the pages
of text, are devoted to what the author describes as "The North
Carolina Case." In these he describes the apportionment formulae
used since 1921, when the state began taxation of corporations on
the basis of their net income. Professor Ratliff concludes that "North
Carolina's pre-1957 tax structure, because of the method of apportioning income, was relatively harsh on multistate business."
Domestic corporations were not allowed to apportion their income
by formula. Only when their income was taxed by another state
could any exclusion be made from the North Carolina tax base. The
formula generally applicable to foreign corporations until 1931 was
comprised of only one factor-property. From 1931 to 1957 two
factors were used, but these varied depending upon the principal
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activity of the corporation within the state. If the taxpayer was so,
engaged primarily in manufacturing, the factors were property and
manufacturing costs. If its North Carolina business was primarily
selling, then the factors were property and sales.
This unusual apportionment procedure was the object of so much
criticism that a Tax Study Commission was appointed by the Governor
with legislative direction to make recommendations for revising the
Revenue Act. In a 1956 report this group urged that domestic and
foreign corporations be taxed according to the same rules, and only
on income reasonably attributable to North Carolina. This was to be
done by apportioning unitary income through use of a three-factor
formula (property, payroll, and sales) for manufacturing and selling
firms. These recommendations were enacted into law.6
The next, and fourth, chapter of Professor Ratliffs book is devoted
to a discussion of the effects of this change, with this conclusion:
The apparent harshness of the North Carolina tax structure as it applied
to industry was largely removed. This was accomplished, not by the
particular apportionment formula adopted, but by giving equal treatment
to domestic and foreign corporations, by applying the same formula to
multistate businesses irrespective of their principal
business within the state,,
7
and by separately allocating nonunitary income.
He also reveals that the revenue loss occasioned by the revision was
about half that anticipated by proponents of the change, explaining
that the principal reason for this is that the effect of the destination
sales factor in the new formula had been underestimated.
Two of the remaining three chapters of the volume are concerned
with economic analysis. The first relates to apportionment, the second
to uniformity. The final chapter, entitled "Conclusion," is largely
a summation of what has gone before since each of the three preceding.
chapters contains its own conclusion with respect to its specific subject matter. It is in these four last chapters that Professor Ratliff
arrives at judgments for which convincing support is lacking. In his
chapter pertaining to the economic analysis of apportionment, he
discusses briefly the theories of business taxation and of apportionment, expressing the view that theory of taxation of business may
be questioned upon theoretical grounds, but recognizing that the
raising of public revenue by taxing corporate net income is an accepted
practice. He closes this portion of his analysis with these pronouncements: "Inclusion of a sales factor, whatever the definition or basis of
sales, cannot be economically justified under the contribution-to6. N.C.

GEN.

7. R TiF,

STAT.

§ 105-42 (1958).
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income approach. A destination sales factor may be justified under
the burden-of-tax approach, but justification of the approach is tenuous.
This view is not shared by the vast majority of state tax administrators, nor has it won acceptance among taxpayers or in legislative halls.
Rejecting this approach, Professor Jerome R. Hellerstein of New York
University Law School, has said:
This position, which is grounded in a theoretical economic analysis of
factors going into the production of wealth, is not relevant to the determination of the factors going into the production of income, or to the factors
that warrant state taxation of income....
Finally, the destination test commends itself on a pragmatic basis. The
states in which manufacturing and warehousing take place, the states in
which executive, accounting and administrative personnel carry on their
functions obtain a heavy weighing in most multifactor apportionment formulas, and therefore there is apportioned to such states a substantial part of
existing tax measures.
If the market state is to share to any significant extent in the tax revenues,
the sales factor and the destination test afford a workable means to achieve
that result. Moreover that test sets up a standard not easily avoided under
8
a properly drafted formula-a fact of no little significance in this business.

Certainly there should be general agreement with the thesis of
Professor Ratliff that there is need for uniformity in the way in which
states define the net income from business and apportion it for their
tax pm-poses. Nor would many of his readers be inclined to dissent
from his conclusion that it seems unlikely that the states will ever
voluntarily agree to the same method. Thus if uniformity is to be
achieved it will be by congressional action under the commerce
clause. There is, however, substantial disagreement with his conclusion that "the formula that would go farthest in rectifying the
situation is a two-factor property-payroll formula."
Those experienced in the field of taxation of multistate business
must be acutely aware of the fact that the property and payroll
factors are not as readily ascertained as Professor Ratliff would have
us believe. Obviously the only practical way to measure the property
factor is in terms of value. Ideally, current appraisals would best
fulfill this need but, in practice, book value is most commonly utilized
since the other data are not readily obtainable. Yet book value is
often a treacherous guide in the sound application of the factor.
Moreover, in instances which are becoming more and more frequent, corporations utilize much property under lease in the conduct
of their business. This property as well as that which is owned out8. PROCEEDINGS,

1960

NATIONAL TAX CONFERENCE

216 (1960).

484
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right contributes to the earning of net income. Yet in most instances
no provision is made to take the leased property into account in
applying the property factor. Professor Ratliff makes no mention of
these complications but ranks his two-factor formula high "on such
criteria as symplicity, certainty, administrative and compliance costs."
Any use of formulae in arriving at the basis for apportioning income from a unitary business is, at best, a rough estimate. Apparently
in recognition of this, most states taxing unitary income have concluded that the best way in which to promote the accuracy of the
estimate is to employ three factors, property, payroll, and sales. The
reason for including the sales factor has been expressed succinctly by
Professor Paul J. Hartman of Vanderbilt Law School in this question:
Should not the exploitation of a state's markets for the capture of profits be
enough for that state to demand something in return, thus satisfying the
requisites of the due process clause? 9

As Professor Hartman has pointed out, improved means of trans-

portation and of communication, together with the development of
mass production have wrought major changes in the economy. It is
now feasible for an out-of-state corporation to exploit the market
within a state extensively without having there any property or payroll. Yet without these sales the entire unitary business would be
-farless profitable.
Professor Ratliff apparently has convinced himself from his rather
limited analysis of tax returns in a single state, North Carolina, that
there would be no significant difference between using the two-factor
property-payroll formula and the three-factor property, payroll, sales
formula. The validity of this conclusion is subject to serious question.
The doubt is not resolved by his analysis of the situation. His study
is interesting for what it has to say with specific reference to North
Carolina and anyone concerned with interstate apportionment of
business income for state income tax purposes will find his book
thought-provoking.
DIWELL L. PIERCE*
THE SuPREmm CouRT: PAL.ADniuv OF FREEDOM. By Alpheus Thomas
Mason. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. 207.

$4.95.
Alpheus Mason has for years been writing on historical problems
that have arisen with respect to the Supreme Court. He has now
9. Hartman, supra note 2, at 43.
0 Secretary, State Board of Equalization, State of California.
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gathered together his authorities in this expansion of a series of
lectures and has plunged into the middle of a debate that is currently
being waged with considerable bitterness.
He begins by recounting the arguments at the Constitutional Convention over the nature of the proposed new Government. The result
achieved was a national government but with significant concessions
being made to the supporters of a confederacy of states. However,
no line was clearly drawn between the two forms of government.
Internal contradictions are pointed to in The Federalistto support the
idea that some of the early statesmen, such as Madison, straddled the
fence and later were able to support the states against the national
government.
In any event, concessions had been necessary to protect the states
and the individual citizens against the Leviathan. It was understood
that there were three buttresses of freedom: the preservation of the
right of revolution, the Bill of Rights, and judicial review.
The nature of judicial review is the theme of this work, and in
particular, the manner in which that problem has been a major issue
of politics at times in our history. Professor Mason argues that, in the
first decades of the new nation, judicial review as exercised today was
understood to be a necessary part of our form of government. As.
exercised today, it is as stated by Chief Justice Marshall in 1803 in
Marbury v. Madison.1
The author admits that there is much contrary modem opinion, for
example, that of Learned Hand and Professor William Crosskey of the
University of Chicago. But, from the evidence that Mason cites, he
feels that those who oppose him have misread history. Critics such
as these have confused the two concepts of judicial review and judicial
supremacy. Judicial supremacy is the objective when necessary social
advances are blocked. But such efforts only brought harm to the
Court. Judicial review, on the contrary, was and is a needed adjunct
to democracy in America.
The demarcation between these two concepts cannot be drawn in
general terms. Time and place are decisive and then, frequently, only
in retrospect. Jefferson's abuse of John Marshall is well known, but
the author does not agree with those, like Justice Frankfurter, who
place Jefferson as an implacable foe of judicial review. Jefferson's
opposition to the Court is dated from the last years of his life. In any
event, Mason concludes by quoting Holmes that "time has been on
Marshall's side."2
Professor Mason's more current interests are exhibited in a long
chapter on the struggle over the role of the Court in the 1930's. As
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87 (1803).
2. HOLmFS, COLLECTEm LEcAL PAPEns 270 (1920).
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the biographer of Brandeis and Stone, he is familiar with and tells a
story of overreaching by the Court and the political repercussions that
led to the Court's reversal of its own course. The author is evidently
not enamoured with Chief Justice Hughes and leaves the impression
of a very wily but equivocal character. He reiterates that Hughes was
a man "of unquestioned integrity," but what that means when the
story is told is open to question.
The last chapter considers the current work of the Court on civil
rights. Justice Stone's suggestion that cases involving certain personal
rights might be subjected to a "more searching judicial inquiry" is
discussed as it blossomed into the claim of a preferred position for
such rights. Stone is described as vindicated in the flag salute cases,
in the first of which he dissented 3 and in the second carried the
majority of the Court with him.4 But the frequency of 5-4 decisions in
these cases concerns the author. The decisions and the accompanying
opinions reflect dissension among the justices on the appropriate role
and place of the Court in the life of the nation.
Professor Mason does not argue that there are or are not absolutes
in the Bill of Rights. He suggests, as an alternative, that "the notion
that the Court has special responsibility toward certain rights, not
because they are inherently superior, or the subject of specific constitutional guarantees, but because no other agency is available to
protect them." 5 And the example most current is discussed, Baker
6

v. Carr.

Because of the qualifications of the author, this volume is an important contribution to the literature on a controversial but vital area
of the law.
STANLEY

D.

ROSE*

Busumss AssoclATEs. By F. Hodge
O'Neal and Jordan Derwin. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1961. Pp. vii, 263. $10.00.

EXPULSION OR OPPREsSION OF

This book is the product of one phase of studies being conducted
under the Management and Research Grant Program of the Small
Business Administration. Professor O'Neal, who was Project Director,
3. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
4. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
5. MASON, THE SupRmvm CotrT: PALLADmiU

6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

OF FREEiDom 173 (1962).

*Attorney, Civil Division, Department of Justice.
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is the foremost authority on the close corporation. The co-author was
research associate on the project.
In several respects this is a unique work. First, it is compactly
written. Despite its relatively small number of pages, it contains much
valuable material. It is a combination treatise, casebook, and practitioner's handbook, although it would not fall into the orthodox category of any of these. It is a treatise in the sense that it summarizes
the causes of squeeze-outs and the techniques involved. It is a casebook in its summary of leading cases illustrative of the points involved
in the text material; the appendix also contains some selected squeezeout cases. It is a practitioner's handbook in its description of arrangements which can be used to avoid squeeze-outs.
The subject matter covered in this book is an area which is often
lightly considered at the time the business is organized. When clients
appear in the attorney's office to have him counsel them in the
organization of a business, they are enthusiastic and display the best
of good will toward each other. To approach this person or these
persons with regard to the possibility of a later squeeze being put on
them should the business prosper or should some personal difficulties
and differences arise among them is a delicate task. Ordinarily, they
want no thoughts of possible internal difficulties later. But, just as
the attorney in preparing a will must discuss with his client not only
the client's death but events involving the death of other loved onesan unpleasant topic of discussion-so must the attorney, in counseling
his clients in a business association matter, apprise them of possible
pitfalls and then work to eliminate or minimize them.
In this work, the authors draw on the experience of leading lawyers.
As they acknowledge in the text, such a study cannot possibly cover
every situation. The techniques are limited only by man's ingenuity.
They have covered the basic patterns clearly and concisely. The
table of contents constitutes a helpful checklist for the practitioner
who is concerned about future squeeze plays and wants to protect
against them.
While Chapter 6 covers squeeze-outs in partnerships, the authors
recognize that this area is not as troublesome as the corporate sphere.
Many techniques discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, involving the
corporate form of business, have no relevance or applicability in the
partnership cases. Most efforts at squeeze-out in partnerships are
rather bold frontal attacks, making them easily discernible and hence
subject to direct counterattack. The more complex form of association, the more detailed statutory regulation, and the more opportunities for setting up a squeeze-out under the guise of a legitimate
action, make the corporate structure a much more fertile source for
the squeeze-out problem.
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Chapter 7 enumerates arrangements which can be used to avoid
the squeeze-out or minimize the likelihood of its occurring. This is of
great assistance to the practitioner.
Were the study to have set out merely the causes and techniques
for squeeze-outs and then offered suggested means of avoiding the
problem, it would have been very worthwhile. No other work known
to the reviewer has been directed at the squeeze-out area to this
extent. However, the study produced an even more significant contribution to this area of jurisprudence. The authors, in the last
chapter, Chapter 8, present their ideas for some changes in legal
controls-both in judicial discrimination in the application of certain
fundamental corporate principles and in statutory rules. The reviewer
found this chapter extremely valuable. It is hoped that it will stir the
profession to action on this problem.
The reviewer found many fascinating points in the book. It would
be difficult to single out such items in a limited review. Further, it
would not do justice to the book.
The book-small in size-packs a heavy punch. Every practitioner
whose practice brings him into the realm of business organization
should not only read this valuable study but use it as a ready
reference. Even if the pitfall cannot be eliminated, it is very helpful
to know where it is located and to advise the client of its presence.
W. EDWARD

SELL*

By Louis Eisenstein. New York: The
Ronald Press Company: 1961. Pp. vii, 263. $5.00.

THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION.

A lawyer would find it difficult to locate a more suitable book for
his 1963 tax reading than the present volume. Mr. Eisenstein, a discerning tax lawyer with many years of experience, has written a
delightful book, in which he theorizes, informs, and entertains. He
theorizes by stating three basic ideologies in federal income taxation: 1
(1) "ability to pay"; (2) "barriers and deterrents"; and (3) "equity."
He informs by tracing these ideologies from their earliest days
through the Eisenhower administration, giving numerous illustrations
of their use along the way. He entertains by his delightful style of
0

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

1. I say "federal income taxation" rather than "taxation," since the author confines
himself largely to the income tax field. Mr. Eisenstein is equally adept in his treatment

of other taxes. See, e.g., Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx
L. REv. 223 (1956).
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writing. His urbanity makes the reader feel that Mr. Eisenstein would
have no difficulty advancing any one of the ideologies persuasively,
if this were his intent.
But rather than persuade, Mr. Eisenstein is more interested in
exposition. He states that "the ability to pay" adherents favor graduated tax rates, with a minimum of deviations from the basic tax
system. While this ideology may have reached its high-water mark
under the New Deal, the New Frontier likewise houses such ideologists.2
"The ideology of barriers and deterrents is a doctrine steeped in
gloom." 3 Starting with this statement, Mr. Eisenstein goes on to
describe the ideology so often associated with the Republican Party.4
Taxes must not place "barriers and deterrents" in front of economic
development. Or, less negatively, the tax law should provide "incentives" for free enterprise. 5
Lastly, the ideology of "equity" is used by each of the other groups
to support various positions that they advance from time to time.
"Equity," says Mr. Eisenstein, in an Orwellian vein, "consists largely
of two principles. The first principle is that equity is a special dispensation for those who are differently situated . . . . The second
principle is that equity is the privilege of paying as little tax as somebody else." 6 For example, in 1948, income splitting was introduced
into the tax law to provide equity as between community property
and common law jurisdictions. But this produced an inequity between the married and single person. Whereupon equity comes to the
rescue again by providing partial relief for the head of household
and surviving spouse. The factual situations in which equity may
be used are myriad.
Mr. Eisenstein has not attempted to trace the use of these ideologies
through congressional legislation. But, before the present session of
Congress has adjourned, a vast amount of hearings, testimony, Committee reports, debates, and legislation itself will have been published
reflecting these ideologies. Indeed, since the Administration is seeking both a tax cut and tax reform, the tax ideologists should have a
field day in 1963. To keep abreast of these matters, a lawyer might
2. E.g., Mr. Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, favored the
elimination of the exemptions for old age and blindness. Mr. Eisenstein cites this as
an example of the disenchantment of the ability to pay ideologist with special exemptions. See EIsENs=N, THE IDEOLOGIEs OF TAXATION 38-43 (1961).
3. Id. at 57.
4. The Democrats are better ideologists. Says the author: "With few exceptions
dispensations are beyond partisan politics. The Democrats are simply more adept in
the use of such words as 'equity' and 'ability to pay.' The Republicans seem unable
to produce the same moral overtones." Id. at 219.
5. See Chapter 5, "By Incentives Possessed." Id. at 89.
6. Id. at 176.
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well familiarize himself with the spoken and unspoken premises that
they will use.
HAROLD G. WREN*

CoRPoRATE LIQUIDATIONS FOR THE LAWYER AND THE ACCOUNTANT. By

Howard A. Rumpf. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc.:
1962. Pp. 238. $17.50.
This book's principal worth is its clear presentation of the basic tax
law affecting the liquidation of corporations. Consider, for example,
the first paragraph of Chapter One:
GENERAL RULE. A distribution by a corporation of its assets, whether

in partial or complete liquidation, results in no recognized gain or loss
to the corporation despite an appreciation or a decline in the value of the
assets as compared with their costs or other basis since acquisition by the

corporation. This is the general rule, regardless of which method of
liquidation (as described in the following chapters) is selected.1
-What could be clearer? There is no danger here that the reader will
be lost in the gobbedygook of tax lawyers. The general practitioner
-will find this book desirable, if not essential, in planning a corporate
liquidation. Throughout the work the author states the basic principles giving simple examples to drive home his points. Internal
Revenue Service forms and corporate resolutions illustrate the various
steps in a liquidation.
Mr. Rumpf first outlines the general rules of corporate liquidations
and the problems of valuation and basis. He then leads the reader
through the principal types of complete liquidations (sections 331,
333, and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), giving specimen

problems following the statement of the rules governing each type.
Lastly, he discusses partial liquidations, stock redemptions, liquidations of subsidiaries, and the elections under sections 1361 and 1371.
If the book has any shortcoming, it is that what it says might have

been said (and has been said) 2 in the pages commonly allocated to
a well-written law journal article. By providing its extensive marketing
facilities, Prentice-Hall makes it available to many more people than
*
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RUmPF, CoRPoATE LIQUIDATIONS

FOR THE LAWYER AND THE ACCOUNTANT 23

(1962).

2. Guess where published and the identity of the author.
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would be possible for either a law journal or a small publisher.3 The
type is large, the margins wide, and the footnotes unobtrusive. The
result, when combined with Mr. Rumpf's fine style, is a highly
readable volume.
In a word, a lawyer would look elsewhere if he were making a
detailed research of a particular point of law involving corporate
liquidations, but for one who is seeking an overview of this area, this
book should be of great value.
HAROLD

ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF RoscoE POUND.

C. WREN*

Edited by

Ralph A. Newman. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962. Pp.
xxiii, 670. $12.00.
This collection of essays was prepared in honor of Dean Roscoe
Pound. He has been truly honored. The contributors, a distinguished
group,' have obviously taken pains to insure the excellence of their
work. An equally significant tribute is found in the multitude of
-itations to Pound's own work-a remarkable tribute indeed when one
notes the scope and variety of subjects covered.
The editor has grouped the essays into three categories, whose titles
are self-explanatory: "The Foundations of Law," "Concepts of Jurisprudence," and "The Impact of Jurisprudence on the Living Law."
Except for this grouping no attempt has been made to "unify" the
book. This is wise. There can be little reason to invite distinguished
ninds with varied convictions and interests to take part in such an
effort only to encase them in an editorial straitjacket of neat sub'division and artificial unity. By avoiding that unpleasant temptation
the editor has given us a collection doubly rewarding because of its
diversity of subject and perspective.
This diversity is immediately apparent in the first section, "The
Foundations of Law." History, tradition, custom, divine revelation,
3. The book was originally published as "Corporate Liquidations" by Har Publica-

tions, Inc., in 1960.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.

1. I deeply regret that limits of time and space prohibit a discussion of the works
-of each contributor.

A simple listing of their names, however, indicates the high

level of work one can expect to find: Peter Stein, Wen-Yen Tsao, Haim Cohn, Jose
Puig Brutau, Pierre Lepaulle, M. J. Sethna, Giorgio Del Vecchio, Karl Olivecrona,
Luis Recas6ns-Siches, Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Miguel Reale, Brendan F. Brown,

Julius Stone, Hans Kelsen, Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Otto Kahn-Freund, Sheldon
,Glueck, Stefan A. Risenfeld, Edgar Bodenheimer, Adam Szpunar, W. J. Wagner,
Federico Castejon, Haroldo Valladao, W. Miifler-Freienfels, Karl H. Neumayer.
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sociological need, and proclamation by an existing power structure are

all treated. The last essay in the section, "On the Functions and Aims
of the State," is particularly compelling. The writer, Giorgio Del

Vecchio, wrestles with the development of a natural law theory of the
state capable of utilizing at least some of the descriptive conclusions of
pragmatist philosophy.2 In one passage he states:
[T]he State tends, because of its very nature, to concentrate in itself all
juridical determinations, either individual or social, which take place within
it, and so frame them into a coherent and organic system.

Therefore, even the regulations which are elaborated in a spontaneous
process by trade-unions or corporative associations must be accepted and
included, as far as is possible, in the framework of the State, so long as they
do not alter those fundamental principles which are the essential reasons
for the existence of the State itself ...
The life of the State is thus translated perforce into a continuous reaffirming and consolidating of its authority not only over individuals, but
also, and mainly, over ...

specific social organizations . ..

.3

The passage is striking in its pragmatic realism: the state tends ever
to draw into itself more of the decision-making power of its citizens;
it is striking also in its insistent idealism: the centralization of power
must not alter those basic principles which are the "essential reasons"
for the state's existence.
Earlier, Del Vecchio defines a "Legitimate State"-a suggestive term
-as one "founded on the recognition of the essential rights of the
human being." 4 What are such rights?
[S]pecially worthy of mention are the right to freedom of conscience,
particularly with reference to religious faith; the right to the respect of
physical and moral integrity (right to honor); the right to congregate and
associate; the right to freedom of speech and press; the right to carry on a
productive activity (right to work) and to enjoy the benefit thereof; the
right to retain property legitimately acquired; the right to freedom of movement and emigration; the right of admittance to public office without
exception or privileges and according to the sole criterion of personal

merit. 5

Since such rights cannot exist in a vacuum, it is the duty of the
state to promote an environment in which initiative, ambition, and
2. I do not mean to intimate that this is the stated objective of the essay, or that
the writer makes any formal analysis of, or reference to, pragmatist philosophy. Rather,
this is simply a statement of my own conclusion-and I make no claim whatever to
being a jurisprudent-that much of the extremely perceptive description of the life of
the state in the essay shows a keen appreciation of the analytical work of writers
usually referred to as pragmatists or realists.
3. EssAYs IN JUSIsptmENcE IN HONOR OF RoscoE POUND 145 (Newman ed. 1962).
4. Id. at 143.
5. Id. at 147.
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conscience can flourish. There must be, for instance, programs for6
the support of education and for the ameliorating of trade barriers.
In other words, while any existing state has the power to promulgate
norms to order society, the legitimate state will promulgate norms so
as to broaden the opportunity for participation by its citizens not only
in the body politic but in the realms of culture, of the exercise of
conscience and of economic development.
A similar frame of reference underlies an essay in the second portion of the volume: "Some Reflections on Status and Freedom" by
Wolfgang G. Friedmann. Professor Friedmann focuses on the statement by Sir Henry Maine that "the movement of the progressive7
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract."
Maine's thesis was derived from his study of the Roman family, an
institution whose later development was characterized by increasing
intra-family independence and individual freedom to enter into contracts. Professor Friedmann tests the continuing validity of the thesis
by setting it against recent developments in Western societies. In
order to do so he adopts a broader contemporary definition of status
as "the sum of capacities and incapacities flowing from membership
of a group or class ... ."8 Status, in this sense, is a public law concept9
particularly adapted to the study of the modern social state in which
"'class" legislation plays a significant role.
Friedmann concludes that, except in the area of family law, Maine's
generalization is no longer valid. He points to, the increasing number
-of situations in which parties are not allowed complete individual
freedom of will to make their own law by contract, but must act
-within a framework of law already provided by statute for members of
the parties' class. Thus, certain types of employees can no longer be
paid less than a federally designated wage; the permissible range of
-clauses includible in insurance contracts is restricted by state statute.
What, then, is the present relation between status and freedom of
individual will in our society? The relation is a complex one in which
-the two are to some extent co-determinants of one another: One's
status determines his freedom to alter his relations with others, while
his freedom to move within the societal structure determines his
.ability to achieve status. Friedmann describes the results:
Status... does indeed play a dominant part in contemporary law. But two
major factors distinguish it from the status of the slave or the serf: first,

the status restrictions are imposed on activities voluntarily chosen. That is
true of the civil servant, of the manufacturer, of the lawyer or doctor ....
6. Id. at 148-50.
7. M.n;, ANcmNT
8. ESSAYS

LAW 141 (New Universal Library ed. 1905).
IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF RoscoE PouND 224

9. See icL at 226-28.

(Newman ed. 1962).
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The soldier can become a civil servant, a manufacturer or an accountant.
Even of the employee it can be said that the status restrictions are less and
less imposed upon a class of people who have no choice of movement. The
second major distinction between the new and the old status is that modem
status conditions, while generally restricting the freedom of contract and
other private-law transactions, enhances effective freedom of movement by
reducing the degree of economic compulsionlo

The relevance of these discussions to the present world situation is
apparent. The Communist world and the Western democracies are
engaged in a bitter struggle for the allegiance of massive numbers
of people. The Communist ideology is based on a concept of class
warfare; its announced goal is the elimination of this struggle by the
creation of a classless society. Del Vecchio and Friedmann certainly
cannot be accused of attempting to be apologists for Western society.
Yet if they are correct in their analysis of recent developments, as
surely they are, they have coherently stated the democracies' answer
to the Communist attack: mobility within a fluid class structure. They
have, moreover, stated that answer in terms responsive to the classoriented arguments of the Communists. True, the ideal they formulate
is broad and amorphous and thus difficult to apply to concrete situations. True, also, the ideas presented are hardly novel; they are
restatements in twentieth-century language of an ideal of equal opportunity long part of our ideological fabric. True, also, they offer no
startling new justification for the formulation of such an ideal. But
they do offer a lucid analysis capable of providing a common bond of
basic purpose among democratic states. Could we but convince the
leaders of our South American allies of the worth of such an analysis,
the prospects of the Alliance for Progress would be immediately enhanced.
Not all the essays in this collection are pitched at this type of problem. But these two demonstrate vividly the continued importance of
jurisprudential writing to society as well as to legal science. The
material in his book is not easy reading; it disturbs rather than entertains. Most of the essays are as praiseworthy as the two discussed
here. Some, for various personal reasons, the reader will find tedious,
dull, and boring. A few seemed to this reviewer unimaginative, some
are subject to criticism in matters of style. Yet it can be said of all
these essays that this is essential writing-essential to the underlying
purpose of the profession. Those who put their hand to it deserve our
attention.
ROBERT

N. COVINGTON*

10. Id. at 237.
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